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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDffiES 
Sanford Levinson* 
Amendment XII: The person having the greatest number of 
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a 
majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no 
person have such majority, then from the persons having the 
highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted 
for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose 
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the 
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representa-
tion from each state having one vote .... ; and a majority of all 
the states shall be necessary to a choice. . . . The person hav-
ing the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be 
the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a major-
ity, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate 
shall choose the Vice-President .... 
Amendment XX: The terms of the President and Vice-Presi-
dent shall end at noon on the 20th day of January .... 
On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan decisively defeated 
Jimmy Carter, the incumbent President (who had himself de-
feated an incumbent President four years before). Perhaps more 
to the point, in the 1980 election the electorate "repudiated" 
much of the legacy of the Democratic Party and declared its pref-
erence for leadership in a significantly different direction.! Ron-
ald Reagan did not, however, take office until January 20, 1981. 
On November 8, 1992, the incumbent, George Bush, garnered 
less than 40% of the popular vote; Bill Clinton was elected with 
43% of the popular vote, while Ross Perot got 19%. Again, a 
desire for "change" was widely viewed as one of the meanings of 
• W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, The 
University of Texas Law School. 
1. I borrow the tenn "repudiation" from Stephen Skowronek's important book 
The Politics Presidents Make: Lel.ldership from John Adams to George Bush 36 (Belknap 
Press, 1993). 
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the election. Clinton, of course, did not take office until January 
20, 1992. 
On November 5, 1996, almost anything is thinkable, given 
the current state of American politics: Perhaps Phil Gramm will 
indeed be elected on a platform of full-scale destruction of what 
will still remain of the 20th-century regulatory- and welfare-state. 
He would, presumably, have to wait until January 20, 1997, to 
begin the final dismantling. Or perhaps disaffected Democrats 
on the left and either pro- or anti-choice Republicans will choose 
to bolt from their respective parties and run insurgent candida-
cies that capture enough of the electoral vote to throw the elec-
tion into the Congress. Any result other than Bill Clinton's re-
election will highlight what I deem the most mischievious fea-
ture(s) of the current Constitution. 
Consider first the easier (and far more common) case-the 
defeat of a sitting President followed by a ten-week hiatus in 
which the repudiated incumbent continues to possess the full 
legal powers of the modern American presidency, including, as 
illustrated by the Bush interregnum, the power to send troops 
abroad (to Somalia) and to pardon criminals (Elliot Abrams) or 
possible collaborators in arguably illegal conduct (e.g., Caspar 
Weinberger). 
This is not, in fact, constitutionally required: It is the result 
of the contingency that we vote for presidential electors on the 
first Thesday after the first Monday, thanks to Congress's exer-
cise of its authority, given by Article II, § 1, cl. 4, to set a nation-
ally uniform election day.z So, as a technical matter, my 
concerns about the gap between election and inauguration do not 
require changing our Constitution at all; Congress need only set 
the election on, say, the first Sunday following the New Year in 
January, with the electors to meet the following Wednesday3 and 
Congress in tum to receive the electoral-vote count on the next 
Monday. Inauguration could then occur unproblematically on 
January 20, unless, of course, no candidate had received a major-
ity of electoral votes (to which I shall return presently). 
What is wrong with the present way of doing things? First, 
there is something profoundly troubling, to a democrat, in al-
lowing repudiated Presidents to continue to exercise the peroga-
tives of what is usually called the "most powerful political office 
2. 3 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1985) (codifying 62 Stat. 672, June 25, 1948). 
3. It should be clear that I am not discussing the merits of the electoral college as 
such. 
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in the world."4 But theoretical troublesomeness is scarcely the 
worst consequence. The response to the Great Depression was 
scarcely helped by the open discord between Herbert Hoover 
and Franklin Roosevelt between November, 1932 and the then-
Inauguration Day of March 4, 1933. Indeed, one motive for the 
20th Amendment was precisely to overcome this four-month hia-
tus and its perceived disadvantages. Those who framed the 20th 
Amendment were on to something important; they simply didn't 
go far enough. The best test of this proposition is a simple ques-
tion: Would anyone reading this essay seriously recommend to 
any foreign country that it adopt an election-inauguration struc-
ture like our own ?5 
The consequences go beyond the mischief that can be done 
by a tired, perhaps bitter, repudiated incumbent. Our current 
structure directly contributes to the pernicious practice of candi-
dates feeling no need whatsoever to identify anyone who would 
occupy high positions in their administrations. Were there only, 
say, 10 days between election and inauguration, a candidate 
would have to identify such occupants, and voters would there-
fore have a far greater sense of what sort of administration they 
were actually likely to get. My colleague Scot Powe chides me 
for believing that voters care about the future Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development. Fair enough, but do no voters care 
about the likely identity of the Secretaries of State and Defense 
and the Attorney General (for starters)? Are we content to keep 
reposing blind faith in elected quasi-kings (or, in the future, 
queens) to choose "the best and the brightest" to exercise power 
over our national destiny and personal security? 
But maybe we need the extra time so that Congress can 
choose the President and Vice-President when no candidate gets 
a majority of the electoral votes. If so, would any sane person 
choose, in 1995, the system bequeathed us by the framers? Why 
in the world should the House of Representatives vote by state 
4. The same might be said, incidentally, in regard to "lame-duck" or, even worse, 
out-and-out defeated members of Congress. Any true democrat should, at the very least, 
be troubled by the ratification of GAIT by the lame-duck Congress in December 1994 
instead of the newly elected Republican Congress that, for better or worse, represented 
an even sharper repudiation of the prior Democratic majority than did Ointon's election 
of the Bush Administration. It is not clear to me why the country benefits from the eight-
week gap between legislative elections and installation in office, but that is the subject for 
another essay. 
5. This question assumes that the country has in fact chosen to have a strong Presi-
dent elected separately from its legislature. As Mark Thshnet notes, almost no other 
countries have in fact opted for our distinctive political structure, and several of the con-
tributors to this Symposium suggest that it might be we, rather than they, who have made 
the fundamental mistake. 
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instead of by member? Even if one rejects Suzanna Sherry's and 
Bill Eskridge's denunciations of the Senate's malapportionment, 
it seems inexplicable that anyone would accept, let alone glory in, 
the possibility that a majority of state delegations in the House of 
Representatives, representing far less than a majority of the na-
tional population, would inflict their choice upon the rest of the 
country. And even if one can explain why the Senate gets to 
choose the Vice President, why restrict the list to two, unless we 
simply want to assure that there will be a Vice President, who can 
thereupon assume the office of the Presidency should the House 
continue to be deadlocked among the three candidates from 
whom it picks? 
In any event, I believe that only the most blind ancestor 
worship can generate any affection at all for our present scheme 
of electing and then installing in office our Chief Executive. We 
now regularly live with the mischief of the election-inauguration 
gap; it is at least thinkable that we will experience the full mean-
ing of the Twelfth Amendment in January of 1997. The Constitu-
tion is broke; we should fix it. 
